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Topics in Microeconomic Theory:
Behavioral Mechanism Design The course takes place: Wed: 14-16
(s.t.), Seminarraum in der Lennestr. 37, 2 Stock. We
discuss models of mechanism or contract design when agents have non-standard preferences
such as loss aversion, limited self-control, social preferences, utility from anticipation, etc. ·
Köszegi, B.: Behavioral Contract Theory. pdf ·
Amador, M., Werning, I, and Angeletos,
G.-M.: Commitment vs. Flexibility. pdf ·
Bierbrauer, F., Ockenfels,
A., Pollak, A., and Rückert,
D.: Robust Mechanism Design and Social Preferences. pdf ·
Bierbrauer, F., Netzer, N.:
Mechanism Design and Intentions. pdf ·
Bond, P.,
Sigurdsson, G.: Commitment Contracts. pdf ·
Caplin, A., Eliaz, K.:
AIDS Policy and Psychology: a Mechanism Design Approach. pdf ·
Caplin, A. Leahy, J.: Psychological Expected
Utility Theory and Anticipatory Feelings. pdf ·
Carbajal, J. C.,
Ely J. C.: A Model of Price Discrimination under Loss Aversion and
State-Contingent Reference Points. pdf ·
Crawford, V. P., Kugler, T., Neeman, Z., and Pauzner, A.: Behaviorally Optimal Auction Design:
Examples and Observations. pdf ·
de Clippel, G.:
Behavioral Implementation. pdf ·
de la Rosa, L. E.: Overconfidence and Moral
Hazard. pdf ·
Desiraju, R, Sappington, D. E. M.: Equity and
Adverse Selection. pdf ·
Eliaz, K.: Fault Tolerant Implementation. pdf ·
Ely, J., Frankel,
A., and Kamenica, E.: Suspense and Surprise. pdf ·
Estebana, S., Miyagawac,
E., and Shum, M.: Nonlinear Pricing with Self-Control Preferences. pdf ·
Galperti, S.: Optimal Screening of Time
Inconsistency. pdf ·
Grubb, M. D.:
Selling to Overconfident Consumers. pdf ·
Heidhues, P., Köszegi, B.
Exploiting Naivete about Self-Control in the Credit
Market. pdf ·
Jehiel, P., Laurent Lamy,
L.: Absolute auctions and secret reserve prices: Why
are they used? pdf ·
O’Donoghue, T., Rabin, M.: Incentives and
Self-Control. pdf ·
Salant, Y., Siegel, R.: Contracts with Framing. pdf ·
von Thadden, E.-L., Zhao, X.: Incentives for Unaware Agents, pdf |
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